Medical device cybersecurity

Medical Device Cybersecurity
Expertise for Your Team

Build security evidence across your device lifecycle. Connect product architecture, software components, security testing, connected services, and postmarket response, with practical improvements that fit your device, intended environment, quality processes, and accountable engineering teams.

A device may depend on embedded software, mobile applications, cloud services, hospital interfaces, update systems, and remote support.

A weakness outside the physical device can still expose sensitive information, alter a trusted exchange, or affect availability, so product security must follow those relationships throughout development and support.

Nestack helps your teams assess defined risks, implement approved controls, and produce traceable technical evidence. We work with product engineering, quality, regulatory, and clinical specialists so security findings enter the decisions and change processes they own.

Three ways to work with Nestack

  1. 01

    Focused assessment

    Review a device architecture, component inventory, connected service, test scope, or update pathway.

  2. 02

    Dedicated security engineer

    Add agreed technical capacity with defined responsibilities, hours, supervision, and reporting.

  3. 03

    Lifecycle improvement

    Coordinate remediation, release evidence, supplier actions, and vulnerability-management readiness.

Manufacturer, quality, regulatory, clinical, and healthcare-operator responsibilities remain with their accountable owners.

02Who we help

Support aligned with your product and lifecycle role

For medical-device manufacturers, software-device developers, connected diagnostics businesses, and specialist product suppliers worldwide.

  • A technician at an electronics assembly bench lined with racks of circuit boards

    Integrate security requirements, testing, updates, and evidence into defined product programmes.

  • A person on a video call with a masked doctor shown on a laptop screen, holding a blister pack of tablets

    Assess applications, backend services, device relationships, and clinical-data interfaces within confirmed product scope.

  • A nurse with a stethoscope tending a patient in a hospital bed, a vital-signs monitor on a stand behind them

    Review connected instruments, companion software, result exchanges, service access, and support dependencies.

  • A technician holding a printed circuit diagram above a circuit board on a workbench, a soldering iron in hand

    Prepare component evidence, controlled deliverables, vulnerability information, and handovers for device manufacturers.

A doctor at a desk with a tablet showing brain scans, talking with a person across the desk

Work alongside your product, quality, and clinical specialists

This is a manufacturer and product-lifecycle offering, agreed in scope, test environment, and safe working methods before work starts.

Discuss Your Starting Point

03Device security scope and threat modelling

Connect attack paths with the device's intended environment

We develop an agreed view of the device system, its users, external dependencies, and trust boundaries.

Technical findings are then connected to the manufacturer's risk process so their significance can be considered alongside intended use, essential functions, and potential patient impact.

What we cover

  1. 01

    Product boundary

    Device variants, software releases, accessories, applications, cloud services and supporting infrastructure, identified.

  2. 02

    Intended environment

    Approved users, connectivity, deployment assumptions, maintenance roles and foreseeable misuse inputs, recorded.

  3. 03

    Trust relationships

    Interfaces, identities, data movement, commands, updates and privileged service pathways, mapped.

  4. 04

    Threat scenarios

    Selected misuse routes, compromised dependencies, access failures and availability threats, examined.

  5. 05

    Risk-process links

    Security findings connected with manufacturer-owned safety analysis, control decisions and residual-risk review.

  6. 06

    Evidence planning

    Assumptions, requirements, verification needs, owners and review triggers defined as the product changes.

04Secure architecture and product control implementation

Make security controls fit the device and its users

We support agreed security requirements in device software and related systems, considering operational constraints and the consequences of control failure. The aim is a reviewable implementation with explicit assumptions and evidence, not a collection of features disconnected from the product's risk analysis.

05Software component, SBOM, and build security

Know what is in a release and how it reached the product

Component visibility is valuable when it connects to the actual released device software and its supporting services. We help review component records, build dependencies, and supplier handovers so a vulnerability notice can be investigated against identifiable product versions and accountable owners.

  • 01Release inventorySoftware components, versions, dependencies, suppliers and relevant identifiers, associated with agreed releases.
  • 02SBOM qualityCompleteness assumptions, machine-readable output, generation methods and update responsibilities.
  • 03Supplier evidenceSupport terms, vulnerability contacts, component updates and missing or inconsistent information.
  • 04Build integritySource access, dependency sources, build identities, artefact handling and release approval.
  • 05Exposure analysisAdvisories connected to included components, configuration, reachability and product-specific assessment needs.
  • 06Change trackingDifferences between releases, unresolved findings, remediation decisions and affected-version records, preserved.

06Controlled device and software security verification

Produce reproducible findings within a safe test boundary

We define security tests around agreed requirements, interfaces, and representative configurations. Testing uses isolated environments and sample data so results can support remediation without exposing patients or disrupting clinical operations, and findings include their conditions and practical limits.

07Device cloud, companion application, and API security

Preserve boundaries between devices, users, and clinical organisations

08Secure updates, service access, and recovery design

Keep product maintenance under controlled authority

09Postmarket vulnerability and support readiness

Turn incoming reports into accountable product decisions

Vulnerability information can arrive from researchers, suppliers, customers, or internal testing.

We help establish a technical handling process that connects each report to affected versions, investigation evidence, remediation options, and the manufacturer-owned quality and regulatory decisions that follow.

What we cover

  • 01

    Intake channels

    Approved reporting routes, ownership, triage information and coordinated-disclosure contacts, defined.

  • 02

    Product mapping

    Reports connected to device variants, software releases, components, deployments and support status.

  • 03

    Technical investigation

    Reproduction, exposure conditions, available mitigations and unresolved assumptions, assessed.

  • 04

    Decision handovers

    Evidence prepared for safety-risk review, quality processes, regulatory reporting and corrective-action owners.

  • 05

    Communication readiness

    Technical information drafted for approved customer, supplier, researcher and operator communications.

  • 06

    Support transitions

    Maintenance responsibilities, end-of-support dependencies, compensating measures and retirement planning inputs.

10 · Cybersecurity evidence and quality-process support

Make technical work reviewable across development and support

Useful security evidence shows which product and version were assessed, what was decided, what was tested, and what remains unresolved.

We help organise selected technical artefacts so your quality and regulatory teams can review them within the product's established documentation and change processes.

What we cover

  1. 01

    Evidence structure

    Requirements, architecture, threat models, controls, tests, findings and remediation records, connected.

  2. 02

    Version traceability

    Assessed releases, environments, assumptions, changes and superseded artefacts, identified.

  3. 03

    Supplier handovers

    Component evidence, responsibilities, limitations and missing inputs from external developers, reviewed.

  4. 04

    Quality integration

    Technical inputs prepared for approved change control, problem resolution and corrective-action workflows.

  5. 05

    Submission support

    Agreed cybersecurity material organised against requirements confirmed by regulatory owners.

  6. 06

    Operator information

    Accurate technical descriptions of connectivity, maintenance, security configuration and residual limitations.

Across the device lifecycle

Medical device security priorities across the lifecycle

Maintain evidence as the product and its environment change. Each stage links to the service on this page that addresses it.

References reviewed October 2026

Priorities for assessment, not legal or regulatory advice. FDA, EU, IMDRF, TGA and IEC material informs scope rather than setting universal obligations, and qualified regulatory owners confirm which requirements and editions apply. Nestack does not claim regulatory clearance, conformity assessment, certification or authority to approve device release.

11Hire a dedicated medical device cybersecurity engineer

Hire a Dedicated Cybersecurity Engineer

Add product-security capacity within your quality processes. An agreed engineer can support a defined backlog alongside product, quality, regulatory, and clinical specialists; competence, supervision, access, availability, and specialist testing resources are confirmed before engagement.

01Assess and specify

  • Map device-system boundaries and assumptions
  • Develop scoped threat models and security requirements
  • Review component and connected-service evidence

02Implement and verify

  • Support approved software and configuration changes
  • Run controlled tests on authorised environments
  • Record findings, remediation and retest evidence

03Coordinate and maintain

  • Track release evidence and supplier actions
  • Support vulnerability triage and maintenance planning
  • Report unresolved risks and required specialist decisions
Discuss a Dedicated Security Engineer

Clinical validation, safety acceptance, regulatory interpretation, independent certification, and return-to-use decisions require their own accountable specialists.

A smiling engineer with dark hair tied back and thin wire-framed glasses, in a light brown shirt

12Frequently asked questions

Frequently asked questions

Showing 19 of 19 questions

  1. This page focuses on manufacturers, product developers, and their suppliers. Healthcare operators may participate in deployment and support coordination, but hospital-wide IT security requires a separate engagement.

  2. Selected software, cloud, mobile, and interface work can be scoped after the product boundary and intended use are confirmed. Qualified regulatory owners determine whether a function is a medical device and which requirements apply.

  3. The agreed scope may include embedded software, applications, backend services, interfaces, updates, provisioning, and support systems. The physical device alone may not contain every relevant trust relationship.

  4. As of 25 October 2026, FDA's final guidance issued 3 February 2026 covers quality management system considerations and premarket cybersecurity content. It supersedes the June 2025 guidance. Regulatory owners confirm applicability and any subsequent changes.

  5. No. Its statutory duties apply within the defined cyber-device and submission scope. FDA's broader recommendations address devices with cybersecurity risk; an actual internet connection alone is not a complete applicability test.

  6. No. FDA's QMSR became effective on 2 February 2026. Its incorporation of ISO 13485:2016 does not mean an ISO certificate establishes FDA acceptance. Quality and regulatory owners determine the relevant obligations.

  7. No. We can support agreed technical work and evidence. Regulatory authorisation, conformity assessment, clinical evaluation, and manufacturer declarations require their respective processes and accountable parties.

  8. Yes, where relevant and agreed. It addresses health-software security lifecycle activities. Scope, applicable edition, interpretation material, and required evidence must be confirmed; using it does not establish clinical validation or automatic device approval.

  9. It helps identify software components associated with a release and supports vulnerability investigation. Completeness, accuracy, updates, and supplier inputs matter. An SBOM does not prove that the device is safe or free of vulnerabilities.

  10. No patient-connected testing is assumed. Work uses authorised isolated devices, representative configurations, synthetic data, and test credentials. Any different arrangement requires a separately defined specialist process and appropriate approvals.

  11. No. Security testing provides evidence within a defined scope. Clinical performance, safety, usability, regression, and quality-system validation require their own activities and acceptance criteria.

  12. Yes, within approved scope and environments. Tests examine device, user, organisation, record, and function boundaries without changing live clinical data, issuing therapy commands, or accessing unapproved patient information.

  13. Deployment must follow the manufacturer's approved design and change process, with operator coordination where needed. Testing, safety and regulatory impact, recovery, and local acceptance must be considered before choosing an update approach.

  14. We can support scoped technical triage, affected-version mapping, reproduction, and mitigation evidence. The manufacturer owns patient-risk assessment, regulatory reporting, field actions, communications, and release decisions.

  15. We can assess technical dependencies and support-transition options with the manufacturer and operators. Device age alone does not determine cybersecurity legacy status. Compensating measures and retirement decisions require product-specific evaluation.

  16. No. The CRA exclusion concerns products to which the MDR or IVDR applies. Other software or digital products supplied by the same business need their own scope assessment; healthcare use alone is not a blanket exemption.

  17. Some documentation, software, and isolated-environment work can be remote under approved contracts, locations, personnel, and access. Patient data, controlled devices, and physical testing may require different arrangements or qualified onsite participation.

  18. Coverage, availability, escalation, and response commitments must be explicitly agreed. No service can establish complete vulnerability absence, guarantee clinical availability, or replace manufacturer responsibilities throughout product support.

  19. Provide a non-sensitive product description, lifecycle stage, intended markets, system boundary, and main concern. Do not send patient records, production credentials, signing keys, or confidential design files before an approved exchange is established.

Contact and scoping call

Discuss your medical device
security requirements.

Tell us which product, software release, connected service, or lifecycle activity needs support. We can define the technical scope, responsible specialists, safe test environment, and evidence expected from an engagement.

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Open times

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Use non-sensitive information. Please don't upload patient data, credentials, signing keys, device configurations, or confidential design records when booking.We will use the details you provide to respond to your enquiry. Read our Privacy Statement.