Engineering / R&D AI Agents,
Monitored for Security

1. Target

   Production databases, deployments, force-pushes, deletions and infrastructure state across live environments.

2. Trigger

   Any write, delete or deploy targeting a production resource without an approved change ticket.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform blocks execution, converts the step to a staged plan, and requires the ticket reference before release.

4. Human override

   Release manager via approved change ticket linked in the deploy pipeline.

Logged evidencechange ticket id · target resource · diff hash · approver identity · execution timestamp · rollback plan id

1. Target

   Network calls, file writes and artifact uploads from agent sandboxes and CI runners.

2. Trigger

   Traffic or file output addressed outside the pinned per-task allow-list.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform drops the connection, freezes the sandbox for forensics, and lets the task resume only on allow-listed destinations.

4. Human override

   None — cannot be overridden in session

Logged evidencesandbox id · destination address · payload size and hash · task id · freeze timestamp

1. Target

   Source files, README text, issue threads, PR descriptions and instruction files agents ingest.

2. Trigger

   Directive text or hidden-Unicode payloads detected in repository or tracker content.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform treats the content as data only, quarantines the artifact, and blocks writes to agent memory and instruction files.

4. Human override

   None — cannot be overridden in session

Logged evidenceartifact hash · payload excerpt · repo and ref · quarantine id · scanner version

1. Target

   Generated code, commit diffs, CI logs, chat answers and artifact stores agents produce.

2. Trigger

   A credential-pattern match in any agent output before write or send.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform redacts the match, blocks the commit or reply, and opens a rotation task for the exposed credential.

4. Human override

   Security engineer via confirmed false-positive disposition in the secret scanner.

Logged evidencedetection id · secret fingerprint · output channel · rotation ticket · block timestamp

1. Target

   Pipeline YAML, branch-protection rules, runner permissions and check configurations in every repo.

2. Trigger

   An agent-authored change touching workflow files, permission scopes or required checks.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform splits the change into a separate PR, requires platform-team review, and blocks self-merge by any agent identity.

4. Human override

   Platform engineering lead via CODEOWNERS-enforced review on the workflow PR.

Logged evidencePR id · workflow diff hash · permission delta · reviewer identity · merge timestamp

1. Target

   MCP servers, tool descriptions, skills and connectors registered for agent use.

2. Trigger

   A manifest hash differing from the version approved at registration time.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform refuses the call, disables the tool fleet-wide, and requires re-approval of the changed manifest by security.

4. Human override

   Security engineering via re-pinned manifest approval in the tool registry.

Logged evidencetool id · approved hash · observed hash · disable timestamp · re-approval record

1. Target

   ITAR and EAR technical data, controlled designs and trade-secret material in prompts or uploads.

2. Trigger

   A classification tag or control marking detected in content bound for an external endpoint.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform blocks the transfer, keeps processing on approved in-boundary models, and notifies the export-control officer.

4. Human override

   Export-control officer via documented licence determination for the specific dataset.

Logged evidencecontent classification · destination endpoint · block timestamp · requester identity · determination reference

1. Target

   Package manifests, lockfiles, imports and build scripts across all repositories.

2. Trigger

   A suggested package absent from the approved registry or below the age-and-adoption floor.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform blocks the install, checks the name against known-good packages, and proposes a vetted alternative in the PR.

4. Human override

   Staff engineer via allow-list addition recorded with a provenance review.

Logged evidencepackage name and version · registry check result · typosquat distance · PR id · approver identity

1. Target

   SAST, DAST, dependency and pentest findings in the vulnerability queue.

2. Trigger

   An agent disposition of not-exploitable or wontfix on a finding above severity threshold.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform holds the closure, requires a security engineer’s sign-off with rationale, and keeps the finding open meanwhile.

4. Human override

   AppSec lead via documented risk acceptance with an expiry date.

Logged evidencefinding id · severity · proposed disposition · sign-off identity · rationale hash · expiry date

1. Target

   Agent-authored pull requests to protected branches across product and infrastructure repositories.

2. Trigger

   A merge attempt where review time, diff coverage or comments indicate rubber-stamping.

3. Action — enforced

   Platform blocks the merge, records model, prompt and context versions, and assigns a second reviewer with a review checklist.

4. Human override

   Engineering manager via attested review confirmation on the pull request.

Logged evidencePR id · reviewer identity and dwell time · model and prompt versions · checklist result · merge timestamp